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A DISSENT
Dissent from Llewellyn on Dissent-Irving Dilliard*
It is doubtful enough whether this layman's patently untrained
reaction to one aspect of Karl N. Llewellyn's magnum opus, The
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, will be accepted for publi-
cation by the editors of the special issue of the Washington University
Law Quarterly. Certainly if these observations are somehow approved
for publication they will appear so far down in the Table of Contents
that the "why and what" of Professor Llewellyn's book will have been
digested adequately, perhaps several times, by preceding writers
within the bar.
As I view the launching pad from which the University of Chicago
law scholar fires his long-in-the-making missile into legal space, his
belief (stated as a fact) is that "the bar is bothered about our ap-
pellate courts-not the much discussed Supreme Court alone, but
our appellate courts in general.", Indeed, it is much worse than this
in Professor Llewellyn's eyes. For he says in his very next sentence:
"The bar is so much bothered about these courts that we face a crisis
in confidence which packs danger."2
Because of the size, scale and complexity of the Llewellyn study,
this layman, as indeed almost any layman might be well-advised to
do in the circumstances, has selected something relatively simple to
inquire into. It is: The role and value of dissent in the deciding of
appeals. Professor Llewellyn's references to dissenting opinions, if
we may rely in part at least on the index, are not too numerous in
500 plus pages. Moreover, the author's remarks about dissents may be
extracted readily for examination.
In Part II, "The Style of Reason at Work," there is a chapter on
dissent in which Professor Llewellyn puts at the outset the question:
"Will the Style of Reason Destroy Court Teamwork? '" 3 So that the
chance of misinterpreting the author will be minimized, let us set
down two pages of his text, just as they appear in the book. They
are as follows:
The first of the "current" samplings for this volume was that
from Ohio. It became most uncomfortably plain that dissenting
opinions had been increasing, as the Style of Reason had also
been increasing, not only from 1939 to 1953, but again from 1953
to 1958. This was to me a troubling idea. Roughly, out of fifty
Ohio decisions on the merits in 1939, recorded dissenting votes
occurred in about one tenth, and there were only three dissenting
* Former editor, editorial page, St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
1. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIoN: DECIDING APPEALs 3 (1960)
[hereinafter cited only by reference to page].
2. Ibid.
3. P. 462.
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opinions. But a comparable count in 1959 showed dissent in one
quarter of the cases, with nine dissenting and three specially
concurring opinions. So: Does regrowth of the Style of Reason
threaten the court? More specifically: is it the regrowth of that
style which kills court teamwork?
Let me answer these questions first, and come to analysis later:
Is it the regrowth of the Style of Reason which threatens court
unity? No. North Carolina is a persuasive exhibit. In our 1940
sample, with the Style of Reason at work, but so to speak still
downy-yellow from the egg, we had out of fifty cases nine dis-
senting opinions and three special concurrences. The Style of
Reason has flourished, since, in North Carolina. But the dissents
have amazingly decreased. And the nasty tone of the 1940 dis-
sents has entirely disappeared.
Second question: Does regrowth of the Style of Reason kill
court teamwork? No.
I note first that the current Ohio dissents have none of the
edge and rancor which characterized North Carolina in 1940.
This suggests that differences of opinion within a court can rest
on other things than difference of judicial method or style.
As a second point, I turn to the other jurisdictions we have
sampled in sequence. In neither Washington nor Massachusetts
has twenty years of patent regrowth of the Style of Reason meant
any increase in dissenting opinions. In Pennsylvania (after
fifteen years) the increase in dissenting opinions remains minor.
Nor, in the other jurisdictions in which our current sampling
has found the Style of Reason at work, have we found the court
plagued greatly by dissent.
New York appears at first glance to be an exception. Out of
thirty-five fully opinioned cases in 5 N.Y. 2d (1959) I turn up
seventeen with dissenting opinions, and (as I read my notes)
twenty-six nonmajority opinions. This would make one out of
four (as in current Ohio or 1940 North Carolina) look pretty
sickly. But one must remember that in the New York Court of
Appeals, five sevenths of the decisions on the merits go off without
full opinion; one has therefore about one developed dissent not
out of two cases, but out of seven.
At least in New York, it seems to me that we can trace this
practice of dissent directly to the Style of Reason. In 1913, before
Cardozo joined the Court of Appeals, dissenting votes were not
infrequent (maybe once out of five or six), but dissenting
opinions were freakish. By 1916 (Cardozo on for two years) one
finds things stirring. By 1927, there is a dissenting opinion about
one time out of seven. I do not see how one can doubt the impact
of that great man and great exponent of the Style of Reason:
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo.
But I note that now, thirty-two years later, and twenty-seven
after his baleful influence departed, dissents are still running
only at about this one out of seven rate.
This seems to me what is to be expected. Not only our examina-
tion but the careful studies of Mentschikoff and Haggard make
clear that men seeking right and justice both perceive the facts
and turn for standards to the body of met and organized experi-
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ence with which they are equipped. These "experience-spectacles"
must of necessity yield differing results both of intake and of
applicable standard, must yield results which differ increasingly
as our modern variegated world dilutes community of experience
among the individual members of the bench and multiplies and
differentiates the situations out of which conflicts emerge to be
adjudicated.
So that the Style of Reason which once could be hoped--even
despite the conflict of Federalist and Republican, or of the Jack-
sonian and the Solid Citizen-to yield some relatively single way
of seeing, and then of judging, for addition to the brew of "the
authorities and justice"-that style, today, must give a wider
range of result. Queer, and lovely, I should argue, that after the
years it yields dissenting opinions only one time in seven, or at
most in four.4
So far as I have been able to discover, that is Professor Llewellyn's
most extended passage with reference to dissenting votes and opinions.
He does, early in his treatise, also speak of them in the chapter on
"Major Steadying Factors in Our Appellate Courts." There he writes:
In another fashion the dissent and its possibility press towards
reckonability of result. Mention has been made of "the law of
leeways"; but it is a law without immediate sanction for breach.
In real measure, if breach threatens, the dissent, by forcing or
suggesting full publicity, rides herd on the majority, and helps
to keep constant the due observance of that law.5
Now I do not know how these comments on dissenting opinions
will add up to all readers, but I do know how they impress me. Their
net, as I read them, is that Karl Nickerson Llewellyn is generally
disturbed by dissent in our appellate courts, both state and federal.
It is true that in the last-quoted passage he finds dissent riding
herd on the majority and, through forcing or suggesting widespread
public attention, helping to keep a measure of constancy in law. But
this one admitted benefit does not bulk very large when it is weighed
with Professor Llewellyn's overall characterization of dissenting opin-
ions as a plague on our courts. Speaking generally, it seems clear to
me that he sees dissent as doing harm to our appellate system and
conversely unanimity serving as a boon.
Now if this reading of the quoted passages is correct, then the
Chicago legal scholar has a different set of values-and doubtless he
should have-from that of many laymen who have tried to develop a
somewhat informed interest in the law and courts. The present
reader, for one, looks on judicial dissent as wholly necessary. Dissent
is no less a requirement in our legal system than it is in our political
system. Historically, dissent is the way the voice of prophecy is first
4. Pp. 462-63.
5. P. 26.
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heard. Because the dissenter may well be taking the longer view, his
opinion, though representing a minority opinion today, frequently is
preview of what the majority will be holding to in the not too distant
future. And so except for immediate application in the passing mo-
ment, the dissent-its character and its extent-may be far and away
the most significant part of appellate decision. It may be the vehicle
of judicial statesmanship.
Between his two periods of service on the Supreme Court, first as
associate justice (1910-1916) and then as chief justice (1930-1941),
Charles Evans Hughes delivered in 1927 his notable series of lectures
at Columbia University on the Supreme Court in action.0 To many
students of these lectures, no passage was of greater interest than
that in which the distinguished jurist expressed his views on dis-
senting opinions. Pointing out that there was dissent in the first
Supreme Court case in which opinions were reported, Georgia v.
Brailsford,7 Mr. Hughes noted that some scholars of constitutional law
and practice regard Chief Justice John Marshall's dissent in Ogden v.
Saunders,8 a case which dealt with the validity of state insolvency
laws, as the masterpiece among the many Marshall opinions over his
long service on the highest bench. After further references to the place
of dissent in our constitutional history, Charles Evans Hughes said:
There are some who think it desirable that dissents should not
be disclosed as they detract from the force of the judgment.
Undoubtedly, they do. When unanimity can be obtained without
sacrifice of conviction, it strongly commends the decision to public
confidence. But unanimity which is merely formal, which is
recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not de-
sirable in a court of last resort, whatever may be the effect upon
public opinion at the time. This is so because what must ulti-
mately sustain the court in public confidence is the character and
independence of the judges. They are not there simply to decide
cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided,
and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree,
it is better that their independence should be maintained and
recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its
sacrifice. This does not mean that a judge should be swift to
dissent, or that he should dissent for the sake of self-exploitation
or because of a lack of that capacity for cooperation which is of
the essence of any group action, whether judicial or otherwise.
Independence does not mean cantankerousness and a judge may
be a strong judge without being an impossible person. Nothing
is more distressing on any bench than the exhibition of a captious,
impatient, querulous spirit. We are fortunately free from this in
our highest courts in Nation and State, much freer than in some
6. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928).
7. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
8. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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of the days gone by. Dissenting opinions enable a judge to express
his individuality. He is not under the compulsion of speaking for
the court and thus of securing the concurrence of a majority. In
dissenting, he is a free lance. A dissent in a court of last resort
is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the
error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have
been betrayed.
Nor is this appeal always in vain. In a number of cases dis-
senting opinions have in time become the law.9
Hughes's predecessor in the chief justiceship, William Howard
Taft, disliked dissenting opinions and did not hesitate to allow this
dislike to become widely known. When Judge Cuthbert W. Pound of
the New York Court of Appeals was suggested as a possible successor
to Justice Mahlon Pitney, Chief Justice Taft expressed his concern
because of reports that Judge Pound "is rather an off-horse and
dissents a good deal.""0 And he added that it would "be too bad if we
had another on the bench who would herd with Brandeis.""
But opposed as he was to dissent, Chief Justice Taft himself wrote
one of the most celebrated of all the Supreme Court's dissenting
opinions. It came in the famous District of Columbia minimum-wage
case, Adkins v. Children's Hospital.12 Justice Sutherland's verbose
majority opinion commanded the support of only four other Justices
-McKenna, Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler. Chief Justice
Taft did not attempt to hide his complete dissatisfaction with what
the majority was doing. At more than one point, he said he could
not understand the Court's decision. Was Lochner v. New York 3
still in effect or not? "I have always supposed," wrote the Chief
Justice, "that the Lochner case was.., overruled sub silentio."14
In a particularly important passage, he said:
Legislatures in limiting freedom of contract between employee
and employer by a minimum wage proceed on the assumption
that employees, in the class receiving least pay, are not upon a
full level of equality of choice with their employer and in their
necessitous circumstances are prone to accept pretty much
anything that is offered. They are peculiarly subject to the over-
reaching of the harsh and greedy employer. The evils of the
sweating system and of the long hours and low wages which are
characteristic of it are well known."
9. HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 67-68.
10. 2 PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFT 1049 (1939).
11. Ibid.
12. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. 2 PRINGLE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1051.
15. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (dissent).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Chief Justice Taft's biographer, Henry F. Pringle, summarizing
the role of the Adkins dissenter in that case, wrote:
It was a fine dissent. Chief Justice Taft might, had he chosen,
have made of himself a fine, dissenting member of the court and
might have swung the court along the path of his own, inner
convictions on major issues-when certain five-to-four decisions
came up-in subsequent years. Thereafter, in important cases,
he suppressed his own disagreements, however. Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital gravely damaged the prestige of the Supreme
Court. It was called a "slaughtering of social legislation on the
altar of the dogma of 'liberty of contract.'" Gompers said that
"in practically every case of importance involving employment
relations and the protection of humanity, the court ranges itself
on the side of property and against humanity .... ,,16
But thanks to his vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Taft could not be
so charged in the momentous minimum-wage case of 1923. And in
the light of history, he was entirely right and pointed the way that
the Supreme Court would eventually take. He had appealed to what
Charles Evans Hughes called "the brooding spirit of the law."17
Quoting Chief Justice Taft's comment on the misguided Lochner
decision reminds us that Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, then
judge of the New York Court of Appeals, cited the same case as
showing the great value of the dissenting opinion. In his Storrs
Lectures before the Law School of Yale University, subsequently
published as The Nature of the Judicial Process and long since be-
come a classic of legal philosophical expression, Justice Cardozo said:
If the new epoch had then dawned [in 1883 when Hurtada v.
Californil18 was argued], it was still obscured by fog and cloud.
Scattered rays of light may have heralded the coming day. They
were not enough to blaze the path. Even as late as 1905, the
decision in Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, still spoke in terms
untouched by the light of the new spirit. It is the dissenting
opinion of Justice Holmes, which men will turn to in the future
as the beginning of an era. In the instance, it was the voice of
a minority. In principle, it has become the voice of a new dis-
pensation, which has written itself into law. "The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
"A constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the state, or of laissez faire." "The word liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
16. 2 PSINGLE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1052.
17. 1 PuINGLE, op, cit. supra note 10, at 68.
18. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as
they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law."' 19
"That," said Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, "is the conception of
liberty which is dominant today." 20
Later Justice Cardozo paid high tribute to the dissenter in the
title essay of his collected addresses and papers, Law and Litera-
ture. Here he wrote:
Cato had a fine soul, but history does not record that he feared to
speak his mind, and judges when in the minority are tempted
to imitate his candor. We need not be surprised, therefore, to
find in dissent a certain looseness of texture and depth of color
rarely found in the per curiam. Sometimes, as I have said,
there is just a suspicion of acerbity, but this, after all, is rare.
More truly characteristic of dissent is a dignity, an elevation,
of mood and thought and phrase. Deep conviction and warm
feeling are saying their last say with knowledge that the cause
is lost. The voice of the majority may be that of force trium-
phant, content with the plaudits of the hour, and recking little
of the morrow. The dissenter speaks to the future, and his
voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the years.
Read some of the great dissents, the opinion, for example, of
Judge Curtis in Dred Scott vs. Sandford, and feel after the cool-
ing time of the better part of a century the glow and fire of a
faith that was content to bide its hour. The prophet and the
martyr do not see the hooting throng. Their eyes are fixed on
the eternities.21
Justice William 0. Douglas spoke of the indispensability of dissent
in his Walter E. Edge Lectures at Princeton University, now published
as America Challenged. In the second set of lectures in memory of
the onetime governor of New Jersey, the Supreme Court Justice said:
The first reported decision of the Supreme Court was rendered
by a divided Court. Georgia had asked for an injunction against
distribution of funds in a lower federal court, claiming a right
to them. While the court granted the injunction, Justices Johnson
and Cushing dissented. And that tradition of the dissent is a
vital one to this day.
The right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable
for the judge of an appellate court. It is essential to the opera-
tions of a free press. The affairs of government could not be
conducted by democratic standards without it. It is a healthy
influence in every classroom, on every board of education, at
every council meeting. It is the right of dissent, not the right
or duty to conform, which gives dignity, worth and individuality
to man. As Carl Sandburg recently said, "There always ought
19. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 79-80 (1921).
20. Id. at 80.
21. CARDOZo, LAW AND LITERATURE 35-36 (1931).
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to be beatniks in a culture, hollering about the respectables."
The right of revolution is, of course, deep in our traditions.
Though we have mostly forgotten it, one State, New Hampshire,
has it embedded in her Constitution. Article 10 of New Hamp-
shire's charter not only emphasizes the right to affirmative
action but goes on to denounce submission to tyranny. "The
doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppres-
sion, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness
of mankind."
We have drifted away from that attitude. During the last
two decades mass opinion has been shaped to fit narrowing molds;
orthodoxy and conformity have had less and less respect for our
ancient liberties; the climate has been less favorable to revolt.2-
That we have paid dearly for this decline in freedom of utterance
is hardly open to question. Justice Hugo L. Black had this in mind
when he closed his dissent to the decision that upheld the conviction
of the original Communist leaders under the Smith Act. Distinguish-
ing between current opinion in 1951 and that of a future day, Justice
Black wrote in his Dennis dissent:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the con-
viction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however,
that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears
subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amend-
ment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in
a free society.23
The "calmer times" to which Justice Black looked came just six
years later when Justice John Marshall Harlan spoke for the Supreme
Court majority in Yates v. United States,24 which many observers
found reversing the Dennis decision in large part, if not entirely. In
the intervening decade, Justice Black has dissented time and again,
and there are those who believe sincerely that these dissents constitute
the outstanding as well as most constructive work on the Supreme
Court in the most important field of all, human rights, in the years
since World War II.
These citations to dissent and its fundamental value could be long
extended. Because Professor Llewellyn refers especially to dissent
in state courts of appeal, let us turn in closing to an Illinois case,
namely, In re Anasta¢plo.25 Back in 1950 the Illinois Bar's Committee
on Character and Fitness refused to sign a favorable certificate for
admission to the practice of law for George Anastaplo, an honor law
graduate of the University of Chicago. The long controversy had its
start in oral questions put to Anastaplo by subcommittee members
22. DOuGLAs, AmEmICA CHALLENGED 4-5 (1960).
23. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951).
24. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
25. 18 Ill. 2d. 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959).
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because of his reference to the right and duty of revolution against
tyrannical rule. This appeared in a required statement on his under-
standing of the basic principles of our government. The case was in
committees and courts, state and federal, for more than a decade.
In the Illinois Supreme Court, where the bar committee was upheld
four to three, the late Justice George W. Bristow, stanch downstate
Republican, wrote one of the strongest dissents in Illinois legal his-
tory. Had Justice Bristow not dissented, had he joined in the per
curiam, the reader of the case would have an altogether one-sided
view of not only the law but the facts in the case of this native, as
it happens, of St. Louis. Consider, for example, the illumination that
comes with these paragraphs from the Bristow dissenting opinion:
I must dissent from the majority opinion on the ground that
it deprives the applicant of due process of law under the Federal
constitution by denying him admission to the bar in the absence
of a scintilla of derogatory evidence to mar the substantial record
of his good moral character....
The constitutional issue in this cause is not, as the per curiam
opinion implies, whether the committee's questions on political or
subversive affiliation were constitutional. The issue is rather,
even if Anastaplo were wrong about the impropriety of such
questions, whether his good-faith refusal to answer them, on the
ground that the first and fourteenth amendments of the Federal
constitution barred such inquiry, is a sufficient basis for denying
him admission to the bar for failure to establish good moral
character ....
I must point out that while I am no less sensitive to the very
real danger of Communist infiltration in the bar than is the per
curiam opinion, I do not believe, as the majority opinion does,
that an indictment of the Communist Party, however justified,
or a reiteration of the lawyer's obligation to his country, or a
warning that the nation must have power to protect itself,
however appropriate, is any substitute for evidence against
George Anastaplo's moral character. Moreover, I am constrained
to call attention to the distorted picture of applicant, which the
per curiam opinion endeavors to create.
The opinion at the outset tries to create the taint that applicant
believes in a subversive political philosophy by quoting isolated
statements out of context from the 1951 record-which is not
even before this court-and by completely omitting applicant's
statements respecting the right to revolution in the present
record. The opinion omits applicant's statement that his views on
the right to revolution are, and have been, the same as those
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and advanced by
Lincoln and Daniel Webster in writings set forth in the present
record. Nor does the opinion refer to applicant's unequivocal
statement in the record: "But as I said when I first appeared
before the full committee on January 5, 1951, I do not think
anyone would be justified at a time such as this, when the normal
processes of government permit reasonable and peaceful change,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to participate in action leading to the overthrow of the govern-
ment. The Committee must realize that I would be no less
reluctant than they to see the right of revolution exercised, ex-
cept in most extreme circumstances. I trust that my position
and what I have contributed to its defense indicates an abiding
commitment to constitutional government."
Instead, the opinion dismisses such testimony summarily with
the statement that applicant's views do not now require narration
because the committee did not find them objectionable, after
leaving the taint from the isolated statements in the prior
record....
Applicant courageously and properly refused to answer the un-
constitutional religious inquiries-.e., whether he believed in a
Deity, or eternal punishment as a sanction for his oath. He stated
that he would respect his duties as an attorney, with or without
the oath, but did not care to speak about whether there were any
religious sanctions, such as the fear of eternal punishment, back
of his oath, or whether he believed in a Deity, on the grounds
that the constitution barred such inquiries. This line of inquiry,
persisted in since the very first session, and apparently based
upon an 1856 decision, was later admitted by the committee to
be improper and unconstitutional since 1870.
The per curiam opinion completely overlooked this portion of
the record. I cannot follow that course, particularly since the
record shows that applicant's refusal to answer these religious
questions had so prejudiced the committee that one member
stated that the refusal to answer had a "substantial bearing on
his [applicant's] fitness to practice law." Such prejudice could
hardly be wiped out by the statement of the chairman that these
improper questions would not be taken into consideration ...
In addition to these significant omissions in the per curiam
opinion, which give a completely misleading impression of the
applicant and the hearings, I must also take issue with the scant
attention paid by the per curiam opinion to the character af-
fidavits and letters of reference submitted to the committee. In
my opinion the court should have given considerable weight to
these affidavits, as did the United States Supreme Court in the
Schware and Konigsberg cases,2C. . . particularly since they
were submitted at the committee's request, on their forms,
and were presented by persons of stature in legal profession
and other fields, who do not bandy about tributes such as
were paid to applicant's honesty, integrity, general conduct
and character traits qualifying him for the practice of law....
Anyone reading this record, whether or not he agrees with
George Anastaplo's interpretation of his constitutional rights,
cannot come away without being impressed by his adherence to
truth and what he regards as basic principles of good citizenship.
His refusal to answer certain questions is not in fear of truth,
26. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); see also Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). (Footnote added.)
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but rather in defense of what he believes to be the truth-that a
citizen, particularly a lawyer, has a duty to defend constitutional
principles, "even at the risk of incurring official displeasure."
His restrained and well mannered testimony and conduct at the
hearing corroborate fully the glowing evaluations of his char-
acter and reputation in the affidavits submitted to the committee.
On the basis of this entire record, it is my opinion that there
was substantial evidence of George Anastaplo's good moral
character, which was in no way marred by a single item of evi-
dence from which the committee could reasonably conclude that
there were doubts about applicant's honesty, fairness and respect
for the rights of others or for the laws of the nation. Under these
circumstances, the committee's action denying applicant admis-
sion to the Illinois bar on the basis of its finding that he failed to
establish good moral character, constituted a denial of due process
of law under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
and should properly have been rejected by this court.27
These extracts from a state appellate court dissent are submitted as
evidence of how much a dissenting opinion may be required, in a
state court jurisdiction, to provide a balanced view of a case and even
the means for approaching an understanding of it. Had Justice
Bristow put so-called "team play" and unity ahead of what he believed
to be fair dealing in bar committees and courts of law, we would know
not only far less about the integrity of George Anastaplo, but also far
less about the integrity of George W. Bristow.
It might be added that when the case was decided in the United
States Supreme Court,28 also by the narrowest possible margin and
also against George Anastaplo, Justice Black prepared a similarly
strong dissent. The Supreme Court's senior member addressed him-
self particularly to the effect of the Anastaplo case on the character
and quality of the American bar. Perhaps a layman may be allowed
to suggest that the opinions in the Anastaplo case, both majority and
minority in the state and federal appellate courts, ought to be re-
quired reading for all members of the bar, present and prospective.
They have their direct bearing on the passages from the book under
review. Also they have their meaning for the kind of bar and hence
the kind of government this country is going to have.
And so this non-professional reader, assuming that he has inter-
preted correctly, dissents from Llewellyn on dissent.
27. In re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, at 201-24, 163 N.E.2d 429, at 439-51 (1959).
28. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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